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cases because the defendant might be denied a fair trial even though
the news media disseminates nothing that would be inadmissible at trial.
Unfortunately, it is necessary to wait until the trial has begun before the
test can be applied because the court must ascertain whether or not the
jurors have been exposed to inadmissible evidence. In that respect, it
might cause delay and added expense. The Marshall rule would give
effect to the fundamental premise that guilt or innocence should be de-
termined solely on the evidence produced in a court of law.40 A literal
application of this premise in connection with the Marshall rule would
seem to declare that a juror becomes incompetent if he has learned of
any evidence through pre-trial publicity. This, of course, would be an
unsatisfactory extension of the Marshall rule. In the sensational case it
would be impossible to find a juror who does not have some acquaintance
with the facts. Therefore, the Marshall rule should be limited to inad-
missible evidence and perhaps to the pre-trial publication of confessions. 41
Because of the defects inherent in the Montana and federal rules it
is submitted that the Montana court should adopt the rule of the Marshall
case. In addition, the federal courts should impose the rule of the
Marshall case upon the states as an essential element of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process clause. Two recent federal cases have applied
reasoning similar to that used in Marshall in their review of state con-
victions. 42 "Fundamental fairness" requires that a judge's verdict be
based solely on evidence that is admissible at trial.
LARRY PETERSEN.
WATER LAW: A STATE CANNOT "APPROPRIATE" A MINIMUM FLOW OF
WATER IN A NATURAL STREAM FOR PRESERVATION OF FISH.-A water con-
servation district, acting under a Colorado statute empowering it to "file
upon and hold for the use of the public sufficient water of any natural
stream to maintain a constant stream flow in the amount necessary to
Briggs v. United States, 221 F.2d 636 (6th Cir. 1955); Marson v. United States,
203 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1953); Krogman v. United States, 225 F.2d 220 (6th Cir.
1955): an unfavorable, incorrect report of evidence against defendant which comes
to the attention of jurors, raises a rebuttal presumption that the rights of the
defendant have been prejudiced.
'Patterson v. Colorado, supra note 14.
"A confession has a natural tendency to prejudice any community. Yet the news
media proffers confessions without the tempering effects of cross-examinations,
contrary evidence, or instructions. Disqualifying a juror who learned of defendant's
confession before trial seems to be in accord with Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368
(1964). The Supreme Court held that a jury determination of voluntariness of a
confession denied the defendant due process of law. One reason advanced by the
Court was that a confession, even if determined to be involuntary, would affect
the jury's consideration of 6ther evidence. A confession read by a juror before trial
would seem to fall within the proscription of this ruling.
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preserve fish . . ."I filed a claim to adjudicate its water right in the
minimum flow of three natural streams. 2 The lower court dismissed. On
appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court, held, dismissal sustained. Acquisi-
tion of a right through appropriation requires a showing of both bene-
ficial use and actual diversion. Therefore, the water district could not
appropriate the minimum flow of these streams unless there was a di-
version. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain
Power Co., 406 P.2d 798 (Colo. 1965).
A basic principle in water law is that the corpus of running water
cannot belong to individuals.3 As a result, water law is concerned only
with a usufructuary right.4 Under English common law running water
was publici juris, that is, the property of the public and while in its
natural state not subject to private ownership.5 The Eastern States follow
this doctrine, 6 holding that riparian landowners on non-navigable
streams have limited rights to the use of water flowing through or
adjacent to their landT Most Western States, however, have rejected the
theory of riparian rights and substituted the doctrine of prior appropria-
tion.8 Under this doctrine land ownership does not include water rights.9
Such rights can be established only by applying the water to a beneficial
use.
lo
The state's interest in water flowing through its boundaries has been
defined both in terms of "title" and "control."" For example, the United
'COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 150-7-5(10) (1963).
Plaintiff 's claim gave the points of initiation of the rights, volume of water, time of
initiation, and ''evidence of the public intention to use the waters'': construction of
campgrounds, fish hatcheries, stock of streams at public expense, utilization for
fishing for 40 years, studies by state agencies of minimum flow necessary for preser-
vation of fish life. There was no diversion.
31 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES § 7 (3rd ed. 1911).
'Id. § 15. A water right, or "usufructuary right" is the right to use the water.
Smith v. Denniff, 24 Mont. 20, 60 Pac. 398 (1900).
51d. §§ 2-3. At the civil law, air, running water, the sea and its shores were part of
the negative community, that is things which as yet had not come into the possession
or control of anyone. Therefore, no one could own these unless he actually captured
them as in a--bucket or jar. The common law called the members of the negative
community publici juris. Waters within the ebb and flow of the tide, however, were
property of the crown.
'Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14 (1894); Weil, Theories of Water Law, 27 HARV.
L. REV. 530, 531 (1913-14).
7Ulbrich v. Eufaula Water Co., 86 Ala. 587, 6 So. 78, 79 (1889). Generally see United
States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., 174 U.S. 690, 702 (1899). 56 AM. JUR. Water
§ 13 (1947).
'Wiel, Theories of Water Law, supra note 6, at 531.
'Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882). For a discussion of the "Colo-
rado Doctrine" as compared to the "California Doctrine", which does not totally
reject the common law doctrine see Mettler v. Ames Realty Co., 61 Mont. 152, 201
Pac. 702, 704 (1921). See also 1 WIEL, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 151-87. Montana
has adopted the Colorado Doctrine. Mettler, supra at 707.
1"Fort Morgan Land & Canal Co. v. South Platte Ditch Co., 18 Colo. 1, 30 Pac. 1032,
1033 (1892); Farmers' Independent Ditch Co. v. Agricultural Ditch Co., 22 Colo.
513, 45 Pac. 444, 447 (1896). But the appropriator does not get "title" to the
water, only the right to use it. See Stone, Problems Arising Out of Montana's Law
of Water Rights, 27 MONT. L. REV. 1, 6 n. 23 (1965).
"The question of whether a state can appropriate a minimum stream flow for preser-
vation of fish has never been decided by- Colorado or any other state following the
appropriation doctrine. There have been decisions which determine a state's interest
[Vol. 27,
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States Supreme Court held that states are given plenary control over the
publici juris waters within their boundaries and can determine the extent
of appropriation or riparian ownership.1 2 The New Mexico Supreme
Court has held that the state owns the water. 13 In that case the ques-
tion was whether, without diversion, a state agency could declare certain
waters open for public fishing. The defendant claimed it could prohibit
public fishing in a reservoir covering its land because land ownership
included exclusive fishing rights. Because the state had not appropriated
the water to the public, it had no authority to declare the water open
for public fishing and recreation. The court held that land ownership
did not give an exclusive right :14
Nor can we approve the theory that, even though these be public
waters, subject to such appropriation, nevertheless they cannot be
used by the public until appropriated by the public for such use. That
would be saying that the public must first appropriate its own prop-
erty, the very waters reserved to it and which have always "be-
longed" to it, subject, of course to being specifically appropriated for
private beneficial use.
Appropriation is not an unlimited right. 15 While an appropriator
may be the first to divert, he cannot ignore the public interest.16 The
state acting through its sovereign capacity can control appropriation.' 7
This is demonstrated by statutes providing for adjudication of priorities
as opposed to the federal interest in waters originating on or flowing through federal
reservations; but this has little bearing on a state's right to appropriate stream
flow as opposed to the rights of private citizens. See Winters v. United States, 207
U.S. 564 (1908); F.P.C. v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1935); Arizona v. California,
373 U.S. 546 (1963). See also Veeder, Winters Doctrine Rights, 26 MONT. L. REV.
149 (1965), and Veeder, The Pelton Decision, 27 MONT. L. REV. 27 (1965).
12California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 163-64
(1935).
'"State ex rel. State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 182
P.2d 421 (1945). The constitutions of most Western States make express dedications
to public use of unappropriated waters within the state. See COLO. CONST. art. 16,
§ 5; MONT. CONST. art. 3, § 15. Generally, see 1 KINNEY, THE LAW OF IRRIGATION
AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 372-89 (2d ed. 1912). The dedications were ratified by
Congress when the states were admitted to the union. Farm Investment Co. v.
Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 110, 61 Pac. 258, 264 (1900); Stockman v. Leddy, 53 Colo. 24,
129 Pac. 220, 222 (1912). The interpretations of dedication have been varied:
Wilterding v. Green, 4 Idaho 773, 45 Pac. 134, 138 (1896) (the water appropriated
is a public use); Wheeler v. Northern Colo. Irrig. Co., 10 Colo. 582, 17 Pac. 487,
489 (1888) (title is in the public); Stockman, supra (state has title) ; Farm Invest-
inent Co., supra (same); Smith v. Denniff, supra note 4 (state owns water).
1
4State Game Comm'n, supra note 13, at 432. (Emphasis in original.) The court went
on to say there could be no estoppel against the state because of inaction. But see
Hartman v. Tresise, 36 Colo. 146, 84 Pac. 685 (1905).
'
5Basey v. Gallagher, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 670, 683 (1875); Fitzpatrick v. Montgomery,
20 Mont. 181, 50 Pac. 416, 417 (1897).
'
6Clough v. Wing, 2 Ariz. 371, 17 Pac. 453 (1888). Even in states where appropriation
does not apply, riparian rights are held to be subject to public uses such as navi,;a-
tion and a municipality's right to take water for its public water system. Minneapclis
Mill Co. v. Board of Water Comm'rs of City of St. Paul, 56 Minn. 485, 58 N.W. 33
(1894); Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 201 Wis. 40, 228 N.W.
144 (1929).
"White v. Farmers' Highline Canal & Reservoir Co., 22 Colo. 191, 43 Pac. 1028, 1030
(1896). The state's police power in this area is partially derived from state's power
to prevent breaches of peace over the distribution of rights in water, and upon the
economical utilization of water.
1966]
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on streams where the volume of water claimed is greater than that avail-
able. 18
In the instant case, the Water Conservation District was a state
agency entrusted with the "conservation, use and development of the
water resources of the Colorado River and its principal tributaries."' 9
The District's right was based upon statutory authority to claim minimum
stream flow. However, the court said that the legislature had not in-
tended "such an extreme departure from well established doctrine . . .
[and therefore] no such departure was brought about by said statute. 20
The court apparently treated the District as a private individual and
applied conventional appropriation rules, thereby ignoring the state-
agency nature of the District.
The statute's purpose was to establish Colorado's rights to a portion
of its running waters. The Colorado Constitution states that unappro-
priated water is "declared to be the property of the public and the same
is dedicated to the use of the people of the state subject to appropria-
tion .... ",21 It also guarantees the right to divert unappropriated waters
and specifically provides that "priority of appropriation gives the better
right. '22 While the state cannot prevent diversion by other appropriat-
ors23 there is nothing prohibiting it from asserting its own appropriation.
Because it would be impossible to claim the minimum flow by diversion,24
the legislature must have intended perfection of the District's appropria-
tion solely by beneficial application and filing of the claim, without
diversion.
25
By granting this power to file claims, the legislature established a
public policy that natural streams are to be used to preserve fish. Water
applied to this purpose is, therefore, a beneficial use. If the state chooses
to treat its claim as an appropriative right, then the only manner for
recording the priority is through adjudication proceedings. The District
attempted to do this in the instant case.
A state can regulate the amount and method of appropriation. 26
Thus, it should have power to appropriate for public use. Because the
state is acting in the common interest, it should not be restricted by rules
"Farmers' Independent Ditch Co., supra note 10, at 449.
19COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 150-7-1 (1963).
Instant case at 800.
=COLO. CONST. art. 16, § 5.
Id. at § 6.
2Larimer Co. Reservoir Co. v. People ex rel. Luthe, 8 Colo. 614, 9 Pac. 794, 797 (1886).
"Even if the state did divert the minimum flow, necessarily it would have to let it
go back into the channel where it would be subject again to appropriation. Cache
La Poudre Reservoir Co. v. Water Supply & Storage Co., 25 Colo. 161, 53 Pac. 331,
333-34 (1898).
In order to obtain a priority of appropriation in Colorado, 'one must file under the
Adjudication Act of 1943; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-9-1 to 149-9-27 (1963).
Under § 148-9-2 the district court has jurisdiction "For the purpose of hearing,
adjudicating and settling all questions concerning the priority of appropriation of
water . . . and all other questions of law and questions of right growing out of, or
in any-way involved or connected therewith . . . . Apparently this would include
jurisdiction over rights not obtained by diversion.
"Larimer Co. Reservoir Co., supra note 23, at 797.
[Vol. 27,
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that pertain to private rights. If diversion is not essential to protect the
common interest in water, then the legislature should not be required to
provide for diversion when a state agency appropriates.
The act of diversion was the most practical method of giving notice
of a right before recording systems were established. But now, beneficial
use and not diversion is the critical test of an appropriation.27 Therefore,
under modern recording systems a diversion is superfluous when water
is to be used in the channel. Even Colorado has held that if diversion
is not necessary for beneficial use an appropriative right may be valid
without it.
28
In Montana a water right can be perfected by using water, without
recording or posting.29 Proof of this "use" right is made by physical evi-
dence of the use. Many of Montana's streams traditionally have been
used for public fishing, and preservation of fish-life should be considered
a beneficial use.30 It is not clear whether a diversion is necessary for
perfection of a water right in Montana,31 but it is certain that beneficial
use rather than diversion of water is the primary concern of public
policy.3 2 Montana needs a statute declaring that preservation of fish life
is a beneficial use of water and providing that diversion, when not essen-
tial to beneficial application of the water, is not required for perfection
of a right. This would avoid an interpretation similar to that occurring
in the instant case.3 3
It is submitted that the court in the instant case erred by ignoring
'Fort Morgan Land . Canal Co., supra note 10, at 1034; Larimer Co. Reservoir Co.,
supra note 23, at 796.
'Town of Genoa v. Westfall, 141 Colo. 584, 349 P.2d 370 (1960). See also 35 U.
COLO. L. Riv. 493, 50r-509 (1963).
'See Stone, Problems, supra note 10, at 2-4.
'There is a recognized public right of fishery. Willow River Club v. Wade, 100 Wis.
86, 76 N.W. 273, 42 L.R.A. 305 (1898); Annot. 60 L.R.A. 481 (1902). Determina-
tion of what is a beneficial use appears to be made as a question of fact in each
case. Generally, if the water is put to a "useful purpose" it is considered a
beneficial use. Fitzpatrick v. Montgomery, 20 Mont. 181, 50 Pac. 416, 417 (1897).
The question of whether preservation of fish-life is a beneficial use has not been
answered by Montana's courts. But cf. State v. Aitchison, 96 Mont. 335, 30 P.2d
805 (1934) (eminent domain).
"Perkins v. Kramer, 121 Mont. 595, 198 P.2d 475, 477 (1948). citing Larimer Co.
Reservoir Co., supra note 23, which said that "the true test of appropriation of
water is the successful application thereof to the beneficial use designated, and the
method of distributing or carrying the same or making such application is imma-
terial." at 796. Clausen v. Armington, 123 Mont. 1, 212 P.2d 440, 450 (1949),
which might be read as holding that non-essential diversion ise not required. Montana
Power Co. v. Broadwater-Missouri Water Users' Ass'n, 50 F. Supp. 4 (D. Mont.
1942), (reversed on other grounds, 139 F.2d 998 (1944)), apparently found an
appropriation for hydroelectric dams without diversion.
"Public policy recognizes the right of a person to "take and use all of the waters
of a stream, if . . . necessary to his use and actually used by him for a lawful
purpose." Mettler v. Ames, supra note 9, at 707. The Montana Constitution state,,:
"The use of all water now appropriated, or that may hereafter be appropriated fur
sale, rental, distribution, or other beneficial use . . . shall be held to be a public
use." MONT. CONST. art. 3, § 15. (Emphasis supplied.)
"Statutory provision for assertion and enforcement of the public's right might be
accomplished by authorizing institution of adjudication proceedings by the Attorney
General or the Fish and Game Commission. Such a provision would eliminate the
uncertainty of the public's right and prevent its possible usurpation, as well as
provide notice to present and future appropriators of the extent of the public's right.
19661
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the state's fundamental power and the Water District's public character.
The state's power to regulate natural resources should not be denied or
limited by doctrines adopted when mining and agriculture were the only
public, concerns. The public's interest in water has changed and diversi-
fied, as is demonstrated by the popularity of all forms of water recrea-
tion. As the demand on recreational resources becomes greater because
of a larger population with more free-time, states must have adequate
methods for asserting the public right.34 Western water law has always
been flexibly administered in order to obtain the most beneficial use of
water.3 5 As Mr. Justice Cardozo said: "The formula had its origin in an
attempt to fit the equitable remedy to the needs of equal justice. We may
not suffer it to petrify at the cost of its animating principle.' '3 6 (Emphasis
supplied.) The Western States cannot allow the doctrine of appropria-
tion to "petrify" at the expense of the changing public interest in the
limited water supply.
JOHN R. GORDON.
STATUTORY PRESUMPTION OF GUILT FROM PRESENCE AT ILLEGAL DISTILLERY.
-Defendant Gainey's conviction for carrying on an illegal distillery
business was reversed by the United States court of appeals.' The court
held unconstitutional a statute2 authorizing an inference of guilt from
the accused's unexplained presence at a distillery. On certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the United States, held, reversed. United States v.
Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
Defendant Romano's conviction of the possession, custody, and con-
"A good example of unimaginative application of the doctrine of appropriation with
disturbing results is Cascade Town Co. v. Empire Water & Power Co., 181 Fed. 1011
(D. Colo. 1910), where. the district court found that the private town of Cascade
had water rights to the spray of Cascade Falls to keep the walls and floor of the
canyon green. The circuit court reversed in favor of the power company that wanted
to build a hydroelectric dam on the falls; holding that there was no diversion of
the spray nor application to a beneficial use because beauty was not an economical
use of water. 205 Fed. 123, 129 (8th Cir. 1913).
wWestern water law originated in the mining camps of California. Basey v. Gallagher,
supra note 15. The riparian theory was rejected (or avoided) by legislatures and
courts because of its rigidity. The mining custom of prior appropriation was better
suited to frontier environment. As more persons settled the land and streams
became fully appropriated, the "first come, first served" maxim of appropriation
proved impractical. The courts and legislatures made changes following the public
policy favoring the most economical use of water. See Wiel, Public Policy in Western
Water Decisions, 1 CALIF. L. REv. 11, 14-20 (1912); Wiel, Theories of Water Law,
supra note 6, at 531-33.
'Epstein v. Gluckin, 233. N.Y. 490, 135 N.E. 861, 862 (1922). Justice Cardozo was
speaking of mutuality of remedy, but the principle is equally applicable here.
'Barrett v. United States, 322 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1963).
'68A Stat. 683 (1954), 26 U.S.C. § 5601(a) (1) (1958) provides that: 'Any person
who . . .has in his possession or custody, or under his control, any still or distilling
apparatus set up which is not registered, as required by section 5179(a) . .. shall
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